HS-BOUNDARY-001 · Targeted security checks
Local doesn’t
mean locked.
The file defenses held in this pass. Browser storage still has a boundary worth understanding.
We checked our own Hand & Signal workspace using fictional files and fresh browser profiles. No new exploitable vulnerability was reproduced. This is a bounded application audit, not a security certification. [1]

Observed / Eight categories, two engines
Test the doors. Keep the receipts.
The run recorded 108 passing observations across Microsoft Edge 157.0.4341.60 and Playwright WebKit 26.5 on Windows. That count includes ordinary controls and 26 XML-part parsing checks; it does not mean 108 attacks or independent vulnerabilities. [1]
| Boundary | Result |
|---|---|
| Document and slide HTML | Four markup-shaped strings remained literal in generated document and slide HTML. Parsed output contained no injected script, image, SVG or event-handler elements. Speaker notes stayed out of presentation HTML. |
| Web links | Five unsupported or credential-bearing addresses were rejected. The valid HTTPS control retained its address and opener/referrer protections. |
| CSV export | Ten formula-like inputs were refused. Three ordinary text controls, including a negative number and quoted multiline text, round-tripped through the app’s CSV writer and parser. |
| Archives and pictures | Traversal-style entry names, case-colliding entries, an oversized expanded part and an SVG masquerading as a slide image were rejected. A small valid archive was accepted. |
| Presentation package | All 13 XML and relationship parts in a generated presentation parsed successfully, including the new name’s ampersand. |
| Failed workspace opening | Invalid JSON, an unsupported version and an oversized file left the prior fictional document intact. |
| Same-site storage | A second path on the same origin could read a deliberately saved fictional device copy. This matches the existing privacy notice. |
| Separate browser profile | A new isolated test profile had no saved copy from the first profile. This is not an account-authorization test. |
No external request or non-GET/HEAD request was observed in the monitored test context. Tests used the actual local application modules and file-opening UI; they did not send malformed traffic to production.
Confirmed limitation / Already disclosed
A page address is not a private vault.
The test saved one fictional workspace through the real device-storage module, then read it after navigating to another path on the same origin. IndexedDB is scoped to an origin; separate paths do not create separate storage security boundaries. [1] [3]
What this requires: code running with that origin’s access in the same browser profile. We did not show that an unrelated website, a remote visitor or another account could read the copy. This is a documented architecture limit, not a newly discovered remote exploit or evidence of stolen records.
The workspace already explains that local saves and downloads are unencrypted, are not a private vault, and should not hold sensitive work on shared devices. This audit makes that limit easier to find; it does not claim to have added encryption.
Practical recommendations
Small choices that protect real work.
- On a shared device, keep sensitive work out of browser storage. Use your own browser or operating-system profile, protect access to the device, and store downloaded backups somewhere you control. A local save is not encryption.
- Share the intended output. A whole-workspace backup can include private notes and working material. Use the relevant document or reviewed handoff export, then inspect the actual downloaded file before sharing it.
- Treat unfamiliar spreadsheet text as untrusted. CSV quoting alone is not a universal formula defense. Keep formula-like cells out of exports intended as plain data and check the destination spreadsheet’s behavior. This audit did not open the fixtures in Excel or LibreOffice. [2]
- For developers, keep untrusted text as text. Encode for the output context, restrict link protocols, limit archive expansion and preserve current work when an import fails. The passing examples here are regression controls, not proof that every input is safe. [4]
Evidence you can inspect. Limits you can see.
Scope: Hand & Signal Release 47, owned local code, synthetic files and isolated profiles. The two engines were run by the same tester and harness; this is not independent external replication. Desktop viewport emulation does not establish physical iPhone, Safari, Android or mobile-keyboard behavior.
Not tested in this pass: Firefox, browser-engine exploits, extensions, supply-chain vulnerabilities, server/account authorization, native Office behavior, production attack traffic, or all malformed inputs. The XML check establishes well-formed package parts, not PowerPoint visual fidelity. A no-finding result does not prove the absence of vulnerabilities.
- Original application observations. Browser Busters evidence,
handSignalAudit. Exact checked source, local runner, original receipts and failures are retained in private operational records. ↩ - OWASP: CSV Injection, formula prefixes, quoting and spreadsheet-specific limitations. Source reviewed November 15, 2026. ↩
- MDN: IndexedDB API, key concepts and same-origin policy. Source reviewed November 15, 2026. ↩
- OWASP: Cross Site Scripting Prevention, output contexts, safe sinks and URL validation. Source reviewed November 15, 2026. ↩